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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2899 
_____________ 
 
LUCIANA BAKER,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
BLOOMBERG, LP - NEW YORK ADMINISTRATOR  
OF THE BLOOMBERG LP LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLAN 
_____________ 
      
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                              
District Court  No. 3-08-cv-06382 
District Judge: The Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
______________                                                
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 15, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 27, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Luciana Baker was denied benefits through her employer’s long-term 
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disability benefits program.  She contested this determination in federal court.  The 
District Court concluded that the claims administrator’s decision was not arbitrary 
or capricious and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.  We agree 
and will affirm. 
 Baker was an employee of Bloomberg, L.P.  She spent most of her shift at 
her desk.  Baker began to experience back pain in early 2007 and, on February 5, 
she took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act.  She applied for and 
received short-term disability benefits on account of “chronic lower back pain and 
disc disease with acute exacerbation.”  Baker’s treating physician, Dr. Paul Cooke, 
placed her on a strengthening and stabilization exercise program. 
 Baker’s condition improved under Dr. Cooke’s regimen.  He advised, 
however, that she should not return to work if her position required “prolonged 
sitting.”  Baker did not return to work.  She instead filed an application for long-
term disability benefits.  These benefits were available to eligible Bloomberg 
employees who participated in the company’s ERISA-compliant Group Long-
Term Disability Insurance Plan.  The Plan set forth an employee’s eligibility for 
long-term benefits as follows: 
Disability means that during the Elimination Period and 
the following 24 months, Injury or Sickness causes 
physical or mental impairment to such a degree of 
severity that [the claimant is]: 
 
1) continuously unable to perform the Material and 
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Substantial Duties of [her] Regular Occupation; and 
 
2) not Gainfully Employed. 
 
A “material and substantial” duty is one that encompasses the “necessary functions 
of [the claimant’s] Regular Occupation which cannot be reasonably omitted or 
altered.”  Bloomberg retained discretion to determine benefit eligibility under the 
Plan.  It delegated this authority to defendant The Hartford Life Insurance 
Company. 
 During Hartford’s claim review, Bloomberg produced a Physical Demands 
Analysis regarding Baker’s position.  This document indicated that Baker’s 
“typical work day entail[ed] seven (7) hours of sitting, a half-an-hour of standing 
(.5) total, and a half-an-hour of walking (.5).”  The document further indicated that 
Baker could “[a]lternate sitting and standing as needed.”  Bloomberg also offered 
to modify Baker’s work station “regarding sitting v. standing ratio.”  Shortly after 
its receipt of the Physical Demands Analysis, Hartford corresponded with Dr. 
Cooke.  He confirmed that Baker’s “only activity limitations and restrictions were 
to limit prolonged sitting and avoid heavy lifting.”  On September 14, 2007, 
Hartford denied Baker’s application for long-term disability benefits after 
concluding that she was able to perform the “essential duties” of her position. 
 Baker filed an administrative appeal.  Pursuant to ERISA regulations, 
Hartford retained an independent medical examiner, Dr. John Nemunaitis, to 
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review the medical evidence.  He spoke with several of Baker’s physicians, 
including Dr. Cooke, before concluding that Baker could return to work.  Hartford 
affirmed its initial benefits decision shortly thereafter.  Baker appealed that 
decision to the District Court, which had jurisdiction to review the administrative 
determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  The 
District Court granted summary judgment in Hartford’s favor.  We have 
jurisdiction to review its judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Our review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary.  Roth v. 
Norfalco LLC, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13119, at *12 (3d Cir. June 28, 
2011).  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
 Hartford was vested with discretion to determine Plan eligibility and an 
employee’s entitlement to benefits.  Its decision is thus subject to reversal only if it 
was arbitrary or capricious.
1
  Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 574 
F.3d 230, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2009).  This standard permits a court to overturn a plan 
                                                 
1
 Baker argues that a New Jersey regulation, N.J. Admin. Code § 11:4-58.3, requires a different 
standard of review.  There are a variety of reasons why this is not so.  Most importantly (and as 
discussed by the District Court), an employee may challenge a claim determination in federal 
court.  Thus, the Plan does not, as Baker suggests, reserve “sole discretion to the carrier.”  See 
N.J. Admin. Code § 11:4-58.3 (stating that a group health insurance policy may not contain a 
provision “purporting to reserve sole discretion to the carrier to interpret the terms of the policy 
or contract”). 
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administrator’s decision where “it is without reason, unsupported by substantial 
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.”  Id. at 234.  Our review must also take 
into account the fact that Bloomberg delegated authority to Hartford to evaluate 
claims and pay plan benefits.  As a result, Hartford acted under a conflict of 
interest.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008).  We must 
consider this conflict “as a factor in determining whether the plan administrator has 
abused its discretion in denying benefits.”  Id. 
 Hartford did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.  To be eligible for long-term 
disability under the Plan, Baker had to prove that she was continuously unable to 
perform the material and substantial duties of her regular occupation.  As Dr. 
Cooke indicated, prolonged sitting was the central obstacle to Baker’s resumption 
of her duties.  Dr. Cooke, however, informed Hartford that Baker could return to 
work if she could avoid sitting for prolonged periods.  Bloomberg was open to 
modifying Baker’s work station so that the “sitting v. standing ratio” was more 
conducive to Baker’s requirements.  Baker, however, never returned to her position 
and, thus, never attempted to work under the modified conditions.  As the District 
Court explained, Baker did not carry her burden to show that, in spite of the 
modifications, she was unable to perform the necessary functions of her 
occupation.  The District Court was correct to enter a judgment in Hartford’s favor. 
